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Recent epistemology has shown an interest for approaches to knowledge focused on re-
sources and processes that are prior to beliefs, such as the impact of environmental stimuli on 
the formation of beliefs and judgments, and the link between dispositions (epistemic virtues) 
and abilities in forming successful beliefs. The use of the notion of animal knowledge in recent 
works by Sosa (2011, 2015) places his epistemology within this trend. In the book that is the 
subject of this symposium, Sosa approaches knowledge from the perspective of an integrated 
and complex epistemic project – containing a reflexive level and a pre-reflexive animal level – 
structured on a reliabilist virtue epistemology centered on the notion of competence. Although 
this broad approach poses difficulties for a synoptic and more systematic view of his theory 
of knowledge, those main orientations are articulated and vigorously defended for each of its 
fundamental components throughout the book, making Sosa’s book a reference for all those 
interested in knowledge as a kind of action. Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of 
animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a posi-
tive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an 
animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and con-
ceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute 
functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of knowledge among 
social agents. Second, we offer criticism of Sosa’s integrative project. It’s not clear that reflective 
knowledge always improves animal knowledge; rather, in order to avoid regress, Sosa should 
recognize that we can have perfectly safe animal knowledge. Finally, we argue that reflective 





2. Competence, animalhood, and emotions
Sosa acknowledges two levels of knowledge – reflexive and animal – and his goal in 
Judgment and Agency is to develop the agent and reflexive aspect of virtue epistemology (p. 
38). This does not lessen the significance of animal knowledge in his epistemology, because 
the animal level is articulated with agent, perceptual, and epistemic competencies. Sosa de-
fines animal knowledge as “apt belief”, that is, “as belief whose correctness manifests the 
believer’s relevant competence” (p. 16, note 8). Characterizing knowledge as apt belief, as 
successful exercise of a competence, allows to treating epistemic gains at the animal level 
as automatic or direct responses to environmental impingements on beliefs and judgments. 
Competences are not a kind of assessment or reflexive judgment, but a “disposition (ability) 
to succeed when one tries” (p. 95). A disposition for action is part of a pre-reflexive human 
system or first-order performance: in perceptual competence, for example, the disposition of 
the eyes to see allows us to perceive adequately the objects around us; in epistemic compe-
tence, the relevant disposition acts adequately in the formation of beliefs that are true and not 
dependent on luck but on the successful performance of a competence. In this pre-reflexive 
level, Sosa’s approach to knowledge as competence and performances indicates that knowl-
edge can be articulated with emotions, especially if we assume that emotions are, in relevant 
cases, pre-reflexive structures that help us to improve performances and gain relevant infor-
mation of the external world. The relevance of emotions on understanding knowledge has 
been sustained by Elgin (1996, 2008), Goldie (2004, 2008), Stocker (1996) and is also recog-
nized by Sosa. In Judgment and Agency he analyzes emotions in connection with a conative 
dynamics associated to agency (p. 139), and with reactive attitudes (resentment, gratitude and 
blame) in functional performance (p. 193). He also discusses in more detail anxiety, perturba-
tion and tranquility in his analysis of Pyrrhonism. However, his discussion of emotions does 
not focus directly on the relation of emotions and animal knowledge in the sense we are pro-
posing here. So, our first move in this paper is to show that emotions have two central roles 
in the pre-reflective or automatic level of our belief formation process: 1) Emotions contribute 
at the pre-reflexive level towards apt competences, and at the reflexive level towards maxi-
mizing our judgment or intellectual performance.  2) Emotions make possible the sharing of 
knowledge among agents and its sharing in social exchanges. 





3. Emotions, competences, and agency
According to Sosa, a competence can be defined by seat, shape, and situation:
With regard to driving competence (or ability), for example, we can distinguish between 
(a) the innermost driving competence: that is, the structural seat in one’s brain, nervous 
system, and body, which the driver retains even while asleep or drunk, (b) the fuller inner 
competence, which requires also that one be in proper shape, i.e., awake, sober, alert, etc., 
and (c) the complete competence or ability to drive well and safely, which requires also that 
one be situated with control of a vehicle, along with appropriate road conditions pertain-
ing to the surface, the lighting, etc. The complete competence is thus an SSS (or a SeShSi) 
competence. (SOSA, 2015, p. 96)
The example renders clear that a competence has several components. We claim that 
there is an empirical sense in which emotions are relevant because they create a positive 
emotional configuration for the competent performance of an act. This has to do with the 
proper shape dimension of a competence. Emotions can play a role here as enhancing resourc-
es for the agent. Driving competently, for example, requires not only a physical condition 
(being awake and alert), but also a positive emotional state or condition relative to our perfor-
mance. We propose that those emotional states have at least three fundamental dimensions. 
Emotional responses at a basic level have to do with being attuned to the activity that is being 
performed (the relevant emotions here are tranquility, equilibrium, contentment, and light-
ness). A second emotional pattern of responses seems to involve commitment or engagement 
with the activity: acting without too much effort, that is, with excessive involvement and 
emotional immersion (the emotions here are involvement, joy, energy, and openness). A third 
aspect refers to the proper shape of the competence from an emotional point of view, that 
is, endorsement, in the sense that the activity is positively good and can be repeated (because 
we feel its pleasantness or feel an inner satisfaction). Competently driving thus involves an 
emotional pattern that supports the action of driving. In that sense, emotions can contribute 
to performance at a pre-reflexive level, without being directly involved in the apprehension 
of bits of information that make up beliefs and judgments, but acting as functional resources 
for improving driving abilities. 





Richer evidence in this regard comes from positive psychology. Isen (2010) and Fredrick-
son and Cohn (2010) have shown that people who are happy with their lives seem more flexible 
in their views on problem solving strategies. This is a kind of emotion that “enhances the current 
repertoire of people’s thinking-action and leads to actions that build up long-lasting personal 
resources” (FREDRIEKSON; COHN, 2010, p. 782). Joy, for example, brings about playfulness, 
and broadens the limits and the creativity of social, intellectual, and artistic behavior. Thus, posi-
tive emotions tend to create favorable conditions for the exercise of competences because of the 
“broaden and build” strategies they imply. So, it is admissible that emotions reinforce the proper 
shape of competence, because liveliness, joy, contentment, and involvement are essential at the 
stage where competence works best. 
There is a second sense in which emotions contribute to Sosa’s approach to knowledge 
as a kind of action or performance. Performances are efforts towards an outcome. Epistemically 
competent performances require reliable information about the environment. Intentionality, one 
of the main features of emotions, can provide that kind of information. The intentionality of an 
emotion is the mind’s capacity for being directed to things in the world. As Peter Goldie (2004, p. 
93) says “A feeling of the hairs going up on the back of your neck can give you prima facie reason 
to believe not only that you are afraid, but also that there is something frightening nearby. And 
if it is in fact true that there is something frightening nearby, then your bodily feelings will have 
yielded extraspective knowledge” (2004, p. 93-95). This epistemic route provided by emotions 
such as fear and affective preoccupation directs our attention to saliencies in the environment. 
In these cases, emotions work as sources of saliencies because they focus on specific aspects of a 
situation. They work as ‘spotlights’ (PETERS apud BRUN & KUNSLER, 2006, p. 17). Walking in a 
dark street while in a state of great euphoria or depression makes one prone to miss threatening 
things nearby. This might not happen if one is frightened. So, adequate emotions seem essential 
to acknowledging saliencies with the adequate intensity and impact, and to responding to them 
adequately. Saliencies also reveal information fast and reliably. “For example, we can immediately 
see that something is disgusting in a way that we would not be capable of if we were not capable 
of feeling disgust” (GOLDIE, 2004, p. 93). Emotions are, in that first sense, sources of beliefs that 
we acquire automatically or without too much thinking. We can explain this automatic aspect 
of emotional activity with the notion of “frame of mind” or “patterns of attention” introduced by 
Elgin. According to Elgin (2008), emotions can be conceived as “a frame of mind or pattern of 





attention that synchronizes feelings, attitudes, actions, and circumstances” (ELGIN, 2008, p. 149). 
Parental affection, for example, allows parents to identify saliencies in a son’s behavior.
By focusing attention, emotions even effect refinements in sensory discrimination. To the 
uninitiated, babies’ cries sound pretty much alike. But parents who are dismayed over their 
infants’ distress and concern alleviate it learn to discriminate among cries. They acquire the 
ability to differentiate the sounds of hunger, pain, frustration, and fear. What we hear de-
pends on what we listen to and what we listen for. (ELGIN, 2008, p. 154)1
By changing patterns of attention through saliencies, emotions act as functional tools 
feeding and reinforcing our way of acquiring apt beliefs about the world. To make that point one 
does not need to prove that emotional reactions are always reliable. One just needs to accept 
that emotional reactions can operate as sources of information like perception. Perceptions are 
not always reliable. But in adequate circumstances they are reliable. Treating emotions as frames 
of mind means that emotions are relevant for acquiring adequate beliefs in the pre-reflexive 
stage of cognition. Animal knowledge is thus essentially emotional, because it provides the 
backstage where other intellectual and conscious processes take place. 
Sosa does not think that the formation of apt beliefs is an “input/output mechanism” 
(2015, p. 37) like we are suggesting here. He claims that a mechanism can be something akin to 
a “central-processing ability of the sort that enables a sensitive critic to ‘decide’ how to assess a 
work, based on complex and able pondering” (SOSA, 2015, p. 37). This means that the process 
of forming beliefs constitutive of knowledge involves a conscious ponderation of an intentional 
kind. We will discuss this point later on, but our main idea here is that Sosa can strengthen his 
model of animal knowledge by acknowledging that belief processes depend on how emotions 
filter and select relevant information at the pre-reflexive stage of believing. In this sense, emo-
tions are not only tools for maximizing performances, but also necessary conditions for having 
1 Parental love, as a salience generator, plays a crucial role in the parents’ skillful dealings with the 
child; and through sustained emotional engagement with the child, the parents become more reliable at 
detecting saliences; their skills become more fine-tuned. In other contexts, a healthy sense of fear helps 
competent individuals to negotiate dangerous situations. An important part of learning to be a good ya-
chtsperson is to learn of what to be truly afraid. (Tanesini, p. 74)





animal knowledge.2 In that sense, intellectual and reflexive competencies involve an ability to 
sort out information, which is something dependent on emotions both in the sense of mental 
openness to recognize some information do not gained by other sources and in the sense of 
avoiding other information. So, reflexive knowledge is possible only if we are emotionally well 
equipped with animal knowledge. 
We have been speaking of emotions in the acquisition of animal knowledge. We’d like to 
explore now a third aspect in which emotions can contribute to knowledge as performance. It 
has to do with the agency dimension of knowledge – knowledge as a social resource or function 
involving cooperation and collaboration, which Sosa highlights:
Epistemic competences are relevant not only to the attainment of a good picture of things 
for the believer, but also to informing others, enlarging thereby the pool of shared informa-
tion. Risky informed guesses do not pass muster as objectively endorsable apt attainments 
of the truth, properly stored for later use, and transmissible to others through public asser-
tion. (2015, p. 175)
As agents we see ourselves in a shared world, where giving and receiving information plays 
a crucial role. Epistemic competence means being able to give useful and meaningful information.
We are accordingly required to assert only what manifests reliable enough competence. 
What is properly asserted is only what is underwritten thus reliably. The standing of this 
norm derives in turn from the requirements for appropriate sharing of information, condu-
cive to human flourishing through mutual reliance. (2015, p. 177)
Sosa highlights here how epistemic competences are particular ways of giving out in-
formation and contribute to human flourishing. There is a clear sense here in which epistemic 
2 One of the cases examined by Damasio seems to confirm this view. A patient named ‘Elliot’ had his 
frontal lobe injured in areas that govern emotional responses. He lost his ability to do many things: “One 
might say that Elliot had become irrational concerning the larger frame of behavior, which pertained 
to his main priority […]. His knowledge base seemed to survive, and he could perform many separate 
actions as well as before. But he could not be counted on to perform the appropriate action when it was 
expected”. (Damasio, 1995, p. 36-37)





competences are like a clock or a thermometer. It makes no sense to blame them for malfunc-
tioning. But in almost all circumstances it’s plausible to expect an explanation for why someone 
shared a wrong piece of information. Agents are accountable for the truth of what they say, even 
when epistemic claims go astray. This accountability condition of our epistemic performances is 
normatively required because of the centrality of truth for our practical purposes and achieve-
ments. But it is arguable that both sharing information and human flourishing depend on how 
much we trust people’s words. Even accepting the truth of what someone says requires trust. 
If we don’t believe that others are able to give us reliable information, the agent dimension of 
knowledge collapses. Trusting people involves interpersonal vulnerability and optimism regard-
ing our partner’s skills and competences (MCLEOD, 2015, p. 3). Such optimism, as Karen Jones 
writes, “restricts the inferences we will make about the likely actions of another. Trusting thus 
opens one up to harm, for it gives rise to selective interpretation, which means that one can be 
fooled, that the truth might lie, as it were, outside one’s gaze” (JONES 1996, 12). Hence, it is 
arguable that this social dimension of knowledge presupposes additional emotional elements, 
such as trust, understood as “reliance on others’ competence and willingness to look after, rather 
than harm, things one cares about” (BAIER, 1994, p. 128). So competence is essential for being 
trusted and trust is essential for the sharing of information. The agent dimension of knowledge 
requires the emotions connected to trust.
4. Is meta-performance necessary?
Another central idea of Judgment and Agency is that second-order reflection improves 
first-order thoughts and performances. Full aptness depends on reflection, it is a performance 
guided by a meta-performance. As Sosa says, “any performance suffers if it is not fully apt” 
(SOSA, 2015, p. 87). In the next three sections, we will raise some doubts about that. It seems to 
us that animal knowledge, that is, first-order performances, can be as safe as reflective knowl-
edge without being guided by it. In fact, reflective knowledge depends on animal knowledge. 
Is it always the case that performing with full aptness is epistemically better than just 
performing aptly? We are concerned with the safety dimension of these performances. So, the 
question can be rephrased: Is it always the case that performing with full aptness is safer than 
just performing aptly? Sosa seems to say “yes”:





A shot suffers if it falls short of full aptness: that is, if the player fails to guide herself to apt-
ness through knowledge that her shot would then be apt. What is needed for these further 
levels of success is what is still lacked by our player when she stands too near her threshold 
of reliable enough competence. She fails to know that she is above the threshold (even if 
she now is, barely so). (SOSA, 2015, p. 85-86)
And two pages later, Sosa makes the general claim: “any performance suffers if it is not 
fully apt” (SOSA, 2015, p. 87).
At some point, Sosa distinguishes between first-order safety and second-order safety. 
While a person is performing within the threshold of reliable enough competence, we can say 
that her performances have first-order safety. But they lack second-order safety if the person 
doesn’t know or even have any clue about how near she is to her threshold of reliable enough 
competence. So, performing with full aptness seems to be always epistemically better, because 
in that case the persons will have the “apt awareness that they are so conditioned (SSS well 
conditioned) that if they performed on the first-order they would (likely enough) do so correctly 
and aptly” (SOSA, 2015, p. 81). The second-order safety of her apt awareness aims at guarantee-
ing apt performance and, therefore, the first-order safety of the performance.  The point of the 
apt awareness is to assess the risk of exercising first-order competence.
However, a person can be in an optimal and safe situation in order to exercise her first-or-
der competence. Suppose that Diana is in a competition that traditionally occurs only on sunny 
and not windy days. She rested well the night before and hasn’t taken any kind of drugs. Diana 
doesn’t seem to need to assess the risk of exercising her competence to shoot. If she wants to 
and has the appropriate knowledge, she can assess her situation before shooting. But her per-
formance will not be safer. Her apt awareness will not improve the safety of her shot, neither 
will it improve the aptness of her shooting. She is already in an optimal situation for exercising 
her competence to shoot and the risk of coming out of this situation is very low. Reflective as-
sessment seems to be unnecessary.
Things change when we think of Diana as a good huntress. Now, the main competence 
is not the competence to shoot, but the competence to shot selection. Diana needs to assess her 
situation to decide whether she has a clear enough view of the rabbit, whether it is near enough 
given her shooting skills, etc. In that case, the apt awareness that she is in a good situation, in a 





good shape and that she is skillful enough to shoot will improve the safety of her shot, indeed, 
it will help to guarantee an apt shot. The main point here is that she could easily find herself in a 
not good enough situation for shooting. In order to be a good huntress she needs to develop the 
competence to coordinate her competence to shot. Shot selection is just this meta-competence.
So, it seems that the kind of activity matters for whether the meta-performance im-
proves epistemically the first-order performance. Some activities, because they are usually 
performed in optimal conditions, do not need to be guided by apt awareness or any kind of 
reflective competence, and more than that, no improvement in safety is attained by this sec-
ond-order guidance.
Sosa sustains that to affirm aptly is better that just affirm. It’s no surprise that making 
statements or claims, as a special kind of activity, is best guided by an apt awareness that what is 
said is right. We say something in the endeavor to affirm aptly. There is a special reason for this. 
When someone affirms something in public, it is implied that what is affirmed is right and that 
the person has evidence for it. These are social norms governing the activity of making public 
statements. So, in order to state something properly, the person should affirm aptly, that is, her 
affirmation should be guided by an apt awareness that what she affirms is correct. Otherwise, 
she would not be guaranteeing that she has the evidence that backs her up. Note that the main 
point of apt awareness is that what one affirms does not make the affirmation safer, but merely 
guarantees that the subject knows how safe it is, since she is accountable for it. As some philos-
ophers say, knowledge is the norm of assertion and we have to agree with Sosa that “the agent 
affirms fully aptly only if guided to a correct and apt affirmation by second-order awareness 
of their competence to so affirm” (SOSA, 2015, p. 80). But that is the case because of the social 
norms that govern the activity of affirmation, not because it is completely necessary to make an 
apt affirmation.
It’s not clear that belief or every other kind of epistemic performance is governed by the 
same social norms, and we would like for Sosa to have said more about beliefs in this particular 
aspect. Any person has lots of beliefs that are not backed up by any kind of apt awareness, al-
though they are as safe as could be. That is the case of the majority of perceptual beliefs that a 
person has in normal conditions of perception. It’s not necessary for her to guarantee that she 
is in normal conditions of perception, unless she wants to say something about them. For the 





purpose of her actions, she can just take for granted that she is under normal conditions. Again, 
the risk of coming out of those normal conditions is too low. It’s not necessary that she takes 
this possibility into account by reflection. Animal perceptual knowledge is in normal conditions 
as safe as any reflective knowledge can be, or even safer.
5. The Regress Problem
Sosa might respond that we are not allowed to take for granted that some activities are 
usually performed in optimal conditions and that we should try to guarantee that they are op-
timal by reflection. In the end, the second-order safety of an apt awareness is always necessary 
to guarantee that the conditions are optimal for the exercise of a first-order competence and 
therefore are necessary for the safety of an apt performance of this competence. However, that 
is not a good line of reasoning for Sosa, because if second-order safety is necessary for guaran-
teeing first-order safety, then, for the same reason, we would need third-order safety for guar-
anteeing second-order safety, and so on. Sosa would then have to face the traditional regress 
problem. In principle, we do not have any reason to think that our evaluation of the situations 
in which we are cannot themselves be too risky. Some conditions have to be met in order for 
reflective evaluation be apt.  
In order to face the regress problem, Sosa could claim that our reflective competence does 
not need to be assessed with respect to its potential failures or the risk of one of its performanc-
es being defective. For some reason, our reflective competence should be taken as privileged 
in relation to others cognitive competences. At some point, Sosa says that we have “a faith in 
reason as our best guide” (SOSA, 2015, p. 87). If this means that the aptness of any awareness 
is out of question, this could not be falser. We are constantly reevaluating our own evaluations 
due to new information gained by perception or testimony. Or we can just check the vast psy-
chological literature on our deductive and probabilistic competencies in order to see that they 
are not in general too reliable (KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY, 1979). If it means that the reflective 
competence should be taken as safer than any other cognitive competence, then this is arbitrary. 
It seems more reasonable to take our main cognitive competences as all equally safe, at least in 
principle. As Reid says,





Reason, says the skeptic, is the only judge of truth, and you ought to throw off every opinion 
and every belief that is not grounded on reason. Why, sir, should I believe the faculty of rea-
son more than that of perception? - they came both out of the same shop, and were made 
by the same artist; and if he puts one piece of false ware into my hands, what should hinder 
him from putting another? (BEANBLOSSON & LEHRER, 1983, p. 84-85)
So, either Sosa faces a difficult regress problem, or he takes for granted the reliability of 
the reflective competence, but, for the same reason, he should accept that we might take for 
granted the reliability of different cognitive competences or even some beliefs about the condi-
tions upon which we exercise those competences. In that case, some animal knowledge can be 
epistemically as good as the safest reflective knowledge.
Indeed, in the Chapter on “Epistemic Agency”, it seems that Sosa defends the latter. He 
says that some cognitions can have epistemic properties in virtue of subpersonal means and 
that as they are passive, they can function as regress-stopping:
Although human belief is very often competent through rational basing, it might also be 
competent through subpersonal means. It is presumably through subpersonal means that 
the blindsighters know. (SOSA, 2015, p. 202)
What could preclude direct, reliable knowledge of one’s own mental dispositions? Even 
mental self-knowledge might be secured thus through direct competence, with no prior 
guiding awareness. (SOSA, 2015, p. 203)
So, an apt awareness about how safe a certain competence is can be taken itself as se-
cured “through direct competence, with no prior guiding awareness”. In any case, we should 
conclude that not only animal knowledge can be as safe as the safest reflective knowledge, but 
more than that: that in the end reflective knowledge should rely on animal knowledge. It seems 
not to be the case that  “any performance suffers if it is not fully apt” (SOSA, p. 87).
A second difficulty related to the regress problem is that a second-order assessment of our 
first-order competence can inappropriately affects its performances. Suppose that Diana, reflecting 
on her shooting competence, comes to the conclusion that she is not reliable when there is wind. 
Because of that, the confidence in her competence weakens, at least when the wind is blowing. 





The lost of confidence disturbs her performance. However, it turns out that she made a wrong 
evaluation of her own competence. In fact, she is much more reliable when there is wind than she 
thought. Suppose also that in general Diana is not so good at tracking her first-order competenc-
es. Her second-order inductive reasoning is not reliable. In cases like that, it seems that the person 
in question would be better off without that kind of meta awareness guidance. There are situations 
in which reflective knowledge inappropriately deprives us of having safe animal knowledge. The 
remedy for this is that we shouldn’t have faith in reason as our best guide, at least we shouldn’t 
have more faith in reason than in other cognitive capacities. Diana would be better off relying on 
her feelings and trustworthy testimonies that her shooting is safe even when there is wind. 
The difficulty above was raised assuming that Diana’s inductive reasoning is not reliable. 
Nevertheless, even if it were assumed to be reliable, another difficulty could be raised. In the 
Treatise, Hume argued that if we were to correct our first-order judgment by a second-order 
judgment “derived from the nature of understanding” (HUME, 1739, 1.4.1.5), that is, from the 
assessment of how reliable we are doing first-order judgments, then, given that our reason is 
not infallible, our confidence in our first-order judgment ought to be lessened. Then “we are 
obliged by our reason to add a new doubt derived from the possibility of error in the estimation 
we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties” (HUME, 1739, 1.4.1.6). This third-order judg-
ment, for the same reason, will lessen our confidence in the second-order judgment, which will 
in turn lessen again our confidence in the first-order judgment. Each new meta judgment will 
lessen more and more our first-order judgment until “remain nothing of the original probabil-
ity” (HUME, 1739, 1.4.1.6).  So, systematic meta reflection about our reliability, Hume argues, 
has the effect of annihilating all belief. The solution to this problem is given by nature. Above 
the second-order judgment, inductive reasoning loses its power of affecting our beliefs. Nature 
protects us from skepticism (HUME, 1739, 1.4.1.7). Here again we can see the role of emotions 
(the endorsing and engaging roles mentioned in section 3) in our cognitive structure and the 
contribution from animal knowledge to reflective knowledge. Our emotions restrain the dis-
turbing effects of excessive meta reflection by putting the mind in a more uneasy state in which 
the inductive principles do not have the same effect as in a normal condition:
Where the mind reaches not its objects with easiness and facility, the same principles have 
not the same effect as in a more natural conception of the ideas; nor does the imagination 





feel a sensation, which holds any proportion with that which arises from its common judg-
ments and opinions. The attention is on the stretch: The posture of the mind is uneasy; and 
the spirits being diverted from their natural course, are not govern’d in their movements by 
the same laws, at least not to the same degree, as when they flow in their usual channel 
(HUME, 1739, 1.4.1.10). 
6. Reflection is important when we are learning, but dispensable 
when the expertise is internalized
Let’s talk again about Diana, the good huntress. We agreed that in order to shoot aptly, 
Diana needs to guide her shooting by an apt awareness that her situation is safe enough for 
shooting, in other words, her decision about when to shoot should be guided by a “compe-
tent second-order awareness that the shot would be apt” (SOSA, 2015, p. 68). It seems then 
that a good huntress relies heavily on reflection in order to manifests her excellency in a 
hunting day. Every shot, if apt, should be backed up by reflection. However, is this a realistic 
image of hunting?
Many psychologists make the distinction between System 1 and System 2 of reasoning 
(SCNHEIDER & SHIFFRIN, 1977). The first System is automatic, unconscious, unavailable to 
introspection and fast, while the second is controllable, conscious, more demanding of cogni-
tive resources, and slower. Phenomenologically we all know how the reflective evaluation of 
our situation and the risks for exercising a competence is a demanding task. We cannot think of 
Diana as taking all this time and effort before each shot, unless she is a beginner huntress. Our 
suggestion here is that reflection loses importance in the exercise of a competence to the extent 
that the person acquires excellence at that competence. Diana learns to recognize automatically 
what is relevant for her situation and for the risk of shooting and she finds out some patterns 
in hunting some kinds of animals, etc. This doesn’t mean that the evaluation of risk is no longer 
necessary, but that it is accomplished by System 1; the evaluation becomes automatic, almost 
unconscious. Diana’s consciousness, while hunting, is directed to the animal hunted, not to as-
sessing her situation. It seems that this is true of many kinds of performances. A good musician 
may think about the music she is playing, not about how she is playing it while playing it. The 
same goes for to the basketball player discussed by Sosa.





The distinction between performance and meta-performance does not go by the board. 
The assessment of how skillful one is remains as a requirement for one to be a good huntress 
(but we would not say that it is necessary in all kinds of activity, as we argued), and in order to 
make that assessment, it’s necessary to have some representation of one’s competence, of the 
situations which are optimal for exercising it, and so on. But, at some point, while mastering a 
competence, this assessment is accomplished by System 1, without the aid of reflection, under-
stood as conscious thought. Is this a problem for Sosa? At first sight, no. Sosa recognizes that 
this kind of assessment can be implicit and unconscious, he says that “the second-order stance 
required need not in general take the form of a conscious judgment. It might just be a presuppo-
sition, an implicit awareness that all’s well enough for first-order judgment” (SOSA, 2015, p. 84).
We think that it would be better to dissociate reflection from second-order performance. 
Talking about implicit awareness is a little confusing, since there is no consciousness involved. 
The trouble with these considerations for Sosa is that there seems to be no reason to make a 
sharp distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Indeed, it seems that 
reflective knowledge, when automatized, is just animal knowledge on top of animal knowledge. 
Reflection, as a conscious activity, has a more marginal importance, although it is completely 
necessary when we are learning a competence or when something goes unexpectedly wrong 
during a performance and we have to deal with it. 
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our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. our approach has 
two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of 
emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. if we follow Sosa and conceive 
knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing 
performance and are essential for the sharing of knowledge among social agents. Second, we offer criticism of So-
sa’s integrative project. it’s not clear that reflective knowledge always improves animal knowledge; rather, in order 
to avoid regress, Sosa should recognize that we can have perfectly safe animal knowledge. Finally, we argue that 
reflective knowledge has a more marginal role than Sosa seems at first sight to suggest. 
Keywords: animal knowledge, emotions, virtue epistemology, ernest Sosa.
reSumo
o nosso objetivo nesse artigo é discutir a noção de conhecimento animal em Judgment and Agency. a nossa 
abordagem tem dois estágios. Primeiro, oferecemos uma contribuição positiva, tentando mostrar que há espaço 
para a introdução de emoções na abordagem do conhecimento animal de Sosa e na sua teoria da competência. Se 
seguimos Sosa e concebemos o conhecimento como um tipo de ação ou desempenho bem sucedido, então as emoções 
podem contribuir funcionalmente para aperfeiçoar o desempenho, e são essenciais para o compartilhamento de 
informação entre agentes sociais. Segundo, oferecemos algumas críticas ao projeto integrativo de Sosa. não é 
claro que o conhecimento reflexivo sempre melhore o conhecimento animal; ao contrário, para evitar o problema 
do regresso, Sosa deveria reconhecer que podemos ter conhecimento animal perfeitamente seguro. Por fim, argu-
mentamos que o conhecimento reflexivo tem um papel mais marginal do que Sosa parece a primeira vista sugerir. 
Palavras-chave: conhecimento animal, emoções, epistemologia das virtudes, ernest Sosa.
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